

STUCK IN THE MIDDLE: THE OPERATIONAL ART OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT

A Monograph
by
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ABSTRACT

STUCK IN THE MIDDLE: THE OPERATIONAL ART OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT by Major John M. Keefe, USA, 51 pages.

The post-cold war era has seen a significant rise in the number of intra-state conflicts. At the same time the United Nations remains committed to operations that prevent, limit, or reduce the damage and suffering caused by such conflicts. As the sole remaining super-power the United States fully supports the United Nations in these efforts. As such the military may find itself drawn into various peace operations unfamiliar to the operational planner.

This monograph looks at one such operation, peace enforcement, and at those particularities that the operational planner must understand. Unfortunately, the doctrine available on peace enforcement is limited at best. This paper seeks to supplement this missing doctrine and to offer some possible solutions to the planner of such an operation.

This monograph draws upon the British experience in Northern Ireland to highlight specific nuances that are important for the planner to consider. It takes the elements of operational design and illustrates how they may be applied to a campaign plan for peace enforcement.

This paper is not designed to be a "how-to" manual, nor is it designed to replace current doctrine; rather its purpose is to cause further thinking on peace enforcement operations and to thereby provide the operational planner with some insights into what peace operations involve in terms of complexity and scope.

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SECTION 1: WHY PEACE ENFORCEMENT?

"The collapse of Soviet Communism has left us with a paradox: There is less threat, but also less peace"

Manfred Woerner¹

In the Spring of 1993 the Commander of the United States Army's 1st Armored Division received an order to prepare his unit for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their mission was to establish peace among that provinces warring factions. Such a mission was unprecedented for "America's Tank Division" which had been designed and trained for the battlefields of Europe. The Division was ill prepared to execute a mission that would involve such concepts as political dominance, perseverance, and minimum use of force. The planning of such a mission was much different from the normal combat operations for which the Division had been trained. The planners were not prepared for the special nature of such a mission. This paper intends to look at peace enforcement operations so as to determine just what the operational planner needs to understand about these operations before developing a campaign plan.

The above scenario did happen and it is likely to happen again to other commanders and their staffs in the Army of today. The end of the bi-polarization of the world between the super-powers has opened the door for increased intra-state conflict. This is particularly true in areas where previously chosen boundaries were arbitrarily determined without regard to ethnicity, language, or culture. In an effort to prevent these intra-state conflicts from becoming drawn out wars the United Nations has become an international policing agency. In his 1992

report to the General Assembly, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized this point.² There has been a distinct increase in recent years in the involvement of the United Nations in peace operations. During the first forty years of the United Nations it conducted only thirteen such peace operations; however, since 1988 that number has more than doubled. Included in this total are 22,000 soldiers deployed to Cambodia and 27,000 deployed to Somalia.³ At the same time the United States, as the sole remaining super-power, has been under increased pressure to take a leading role in peace operations.⁴

The United Nations success rate for past peace enforcement operations has, however, been dismal at best. This was primarily due to the lack of understanding of how to conduct adequate planning for such an operation. The United Nations' operation in the Congo in 1962 provides a good example of this lack of understanding of how to do adequate planning. During that mission the United Nations spent four-hundred million dollars and lost 234 men. In the end there were over one million dead and the Congo was no more stable than before the United Nations had intervened.⁵

Another common failure in peace enforcement operations is planning for the wrong type of operation. This is true today in the former Yugoslavia. At the end of 1993 there were over 27,000 personnel on duty in that country; all-in-all some forty nations were represented. At the same time there was no sign of any progress being made toward peace within the area of operations. The fundamental reason for this failure to establish peace was that the United Nations was attempting to keep the peace in a non-cooperative environment.⁶ They had sent peacekeepers to do peace enforcement. The United States Marines in Lebanon in 1983 is another example of this type of failure. The Marines were committed initially as peacekeepers though by the spring of 1983

the more radical Moslem elements viewed the Marines as allies of their Lebanese and Israeli enemies and therefore began to target them.⁷ Put differently, the Marines had lost consent and thus became de-facto peace enforcers or participants in an urban civil war. Unfortunately, they continued to operate under the guise, rules of engagement, and instructions of peacekeepers. As a consequence 240 Marines died. These unfortunate examples suggest what can happen when commanders and planners fail to understand the nuances involved in planning peace enforcement operations.

It is this failure of planners to comprehend the intellectual shift required for peace enforcement operations that can lead to disaster. Although peace enforcement is an armed intervention, it is very different from war.⁸ Current United States doctrine describes peace enforcement as:

The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization. The general purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach long term political settlements.⁹

Peace enforcement compels belligerents to stop fighting and begin talking. It is used when the belligerents will not consent to the introduction of peacekeeping forces. This definition clearly suggests that the application of military force must be interconnected with the political and humanitarian side of the mission. The planner must realize that military actions by themselves are not enough to resolve the conflict.

In light of the difficulties associated with planning peace enforcement operations where does one go to find some solutions? Normally, the answer is doctrine. However, a quick overview of the doctrinal publications available to the operational planner reveals a distinct lack of guidance. This problem of a lack of relevant doctrine arose during Operation Just Cause in Panama. Planners were guided by capstone Army doctrine

relying on overwhelming speed and firepower. Although the soldiers showed great restraint in the use of force many Panamanian civilians died needlessly because of such excessive application of force. If there had been proper doctrine to guide these soldiers then these casualties might have been reduced.¹⁰

Beginning with the current United States Army doctrine and its capstone manual, Field Manual 100-5, it is evident that the treatment of peace enforcement operations is superficial at best. The 1990 version of Field Manual 100-20 (Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict) allocates only four paragraphs to peace enforcement.¹¹ The draft 1994 version of that document does provide more detailed coverage on peace enforcement; however, it is unclear if that version is going to be published.¹² This lack of doctrine on peace enforcement is also conspicuously absent from the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI prescribes the authority for peacekeeping while Chapter VII describes the use of force to counter aggression. However, Chapter VII is normally associated with inter-state wars such as the Korean conflict of 1950. Peace enforcement involves a mix of both Chapter VI and VII of the current Charter, and therefore these Chapters provide at best uncertain guidance for the operational planner.¹³

Given the likelihood of peace enforcement missions in the future and given the lack of suitable doctrine for such missions what is the operational planner to do when ordered to plan a peace enforcement operation? There are not many previous examples of the United States military being involved in peace enforcement operations from which to gain insight. Interventions in the Congo in 1962, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Lebanon in 1982-1984, and in Somalia in 1993 provide only a limited data base on which to draw. Moreover, the materials available do not address the subject at the operational level. This paper is designed to

fill in these doctrinal gaps and enlighten the mind of the operational planner as to what considerations must be taken into account prior to developing a campaign plan. It is not designed to be a "how-to" document but one that provokes thought and consideration on a much maligned and ignored subject.

In an attempt to answer this question for the operational planner the British experience in Northern Ireland will provide an analytical case study. Obviously other examples could be used, however, the British experience is good example of the type of operation in which the United States Army may be employed. In particular the period between 1969 and 1972 shows how the British employed the elements of operational design in an attempt to bring peace to a troubled region. However, before attempting to apply the British experience to operational design it is first necessary to understand the situation of Northern Ireland.

SECTION 2: TWENTY-SIX PLUS SIX EQUALS ONE

"If you think you're not confused you just don't understand what's going on."

An old Belfast saying.

The current ethno-religious problems existing in Northern Ireland date as far back as 1169. In that year Robert Fitz Stephen led four-hundred British soldiers to Ireland to subjugate the Irish people to British rule. This theme of subjugation is prevalent throughout the history of Ireland and closely linked to the current problems. Life in Ireland moved along smoothly until the mid sixteenth century when England increased her control over Ireland through the establishment of plantations. This led to the

uprising in 1591 where Hugh O'Neill attempted to gain independence for Ireland. The defeat of this rebellion in 1603 resulted in the flight of the Irish Earls and an influx of Protestant colonizers.

In 1610 King James I of England launched one of the most concentrated implantations in history.¹⁴ Implantation was the process of evicting Irish Catholic landlords and tenants from their property and replacing them with Protestants. This eventually destroyed the Irish upper and middle classes; thereby destroying Irish culture. This implantation was so successful that between 1603 and 1700 the amount of land owned by the Irish dropped from over 90% to 15%.¹⁵ The result of this implantation was a patchwork of alien and hostile cultures living in close proximity to each other; not unlike the relationship between the American colonists and the Indians.¹⁶

The policy of colonization eventually led to revolts, the first occurring in 1641 in the Ulster region of Ireland. Oliver Cromwell and the English Army arrived in 1649 and defeated the rebels. Cromwell increased the implantation efforts of his predecessors. However, the coronation of Catholic James II as King of England in 1688 brought renewed hope to the Catholic population. Robert Talbot, the Duke of Tyrconnel, was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and began replacing Protestants by Catholics in positions of power and influence.¹⁷ Unfortunately for the Catholics, James II was overthrown in 1689 by William of Orange and he fled to Ireland. However, James' rule in Ireland proved short lived as William of Orange defeated James II at the Battle of the Boyne and Aughrim. James finally surrendered his forces at Limerick in October 1691.

These victories established the Protestant ascendancy and led to the Penal Codes. These laws were a death knell for the Catholics because it eliminated them from political and economic

power. Tensions soon arose in Ulster as Catholics began to replace Protestants as tenant farmers. This was because the Catholics would work the land for far less money than the Protestants. The result was the formation of armed groups such as the Orange Boys, which later became the Orange Order. They were formed to protect the poorest Protestant farmers and terrorize the Catholics.¹⁸ The eighteenth century ended with another unsuccessful attempt at Irish freedom in 1798 led by Theobald Wolfe Tone.

Economic competition between Catholics and Protestants during the nineteenth century led to an increase in sectarian riots in the latter half of the century.¹⁹ Depression and the potato famine forced thousands of Catholics into the cities where they now competed with the Protestants for jobs. This combined with the introduction of the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886 prompted further unrest in Ireland. The House of Commons passed the Bill but the more conservative House of Lords defeated it. The Protestants saw Home Rule as "Rome" rule and violently opposed anything that would sever their ties to England. Belfast broke into weeks of rioting verging on civil war and the Orange Order gained ever more support from the Protestants. Home Rule became a reality in 1914 because the House of Lords no longer possessed a veto power and thus the bill passed by default.²⁰

In response the Protestants formed the Ulster Volunteer Force to resist Home Rule. This was a para-military organization that numbered over 100,000. In response, Catholics in the south formed their own volunteer armies. Recruits from these Catholic Armies sparked the 1916 Easter uprising. During that rebellion a small group rebels seized key points in Dublin and proclaimed the Irish Republic. Once again an oppressive British reaction crushed the rebellion. This brutal British repression of the Easter

uprising further galvanized support for the leaders of the 1916 rebellion; namely, the Sinn Fein party, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The Sinn Fein party then won most of the Irish seats in Westminster in the elections of 1918 but refused to sit on the English parliament. They formed their own Parliament, the Dail Eireann, and declared independence.

The British reacted by sending forces to suppress the revolution; thereby beginning the Anglo-Irish War. The harsh tactics adopted by the British "Black and Tans" quickly galvanized the Irish people behind the IRA.²¹ The Sinn Fein party organized a broad base of popular support for the IRA; leading to its victory. The war ended on 22 December 1921 with the signing of the Government of Ireland Act.²²

Although the Government of Ireland Act was supposed to bring an end to violence in Ireland it soon became the cause of continued violence. This was because the Act separated Ireland into the twenty-six counties of southern Ireland called the Irish Free State and the six counties of the north (See Figure 1). Initially all parties believed the split would be temporary.²³ The six counties of the north, called Northern Ireland, were given the opportunity to join the south or remain part of England. These six counties were 66% Protestant and so decided to remain part of England.

Initially the Dail refused to recognize the Government of Ireland Act but it eventually passed it by a vote of 66 to 56. This sparked the Irish Civil War between pro-treaty forces, supporting a temporarily divided Ireland, and anti-treaty forces, opposed to this division. This civil war lasted for eleven months and ended with victory for the pro-treaty forces in May 1923. The act completed the division of Ireland as we know it today. The




Figure 1. The Six Counties of Northern Ireland.

only real question remaining was the maximum area that could be controlled by a Protestant majority.²⁴

After the civil war ended the transition to a Republic went fairly well in the south. In the north, on the other hand, problems quickly emerged. The Protestant majority immediately gerrymandered the voting districts to insure it maintained political and economic power in the province. The IRA reacted by waging war against the Protestants of the north to bring about the unification of Ireland. Economic difficulties in Northern Ireland also fueled rebellion within the province. Despite these bitter disputes in Ulster the Royal Ulster Constabulary, a quasi-military police force, was always able to maintain some semblance of order. The IRA launched several campaigns over the years in hopes of outside intervention by the United Nations; but by 1962 the IRA was all but defunct as an organized element.

The IRA's resurgence in the late 1960's coincided with civil rights demonstrations in Northern Ireland. The first demonstration over housing discrimination took place relatively peacefully on 20 June 1968. This peacefulness did not last long as the civil rights demonstrations soon became a source of conflict and violence. The first outbreak of violence occurred in Derry (Londonderry) on 5 October 1968 pitting civil rights marchers against Protestant extremists with the police in the middle.²⁵ The situation then began to deteriorate rapidly with further violence during the Protestant (Orange) marches of July and August. These marches take place yearly to commemorate the lifting of the siege of Londonderry and the Battle of the Boyne. They serve to reemphasize the reality in Northern Ireland of Protestant supremacy over the Catholics. Finally, on 15 August 1969, the violence got completely out of hand and the police were unable to suppress it. This led the government of Northern

Ireland at Stormont to call for aid from Great Britain. This aid came in the form of the British Army as peace enforcers.

This discussion on the history of Ireland could lead to a simplistic assessment of the struggle as due entirely to religion. In this case, religion is only a convenient label for a conflict fought over the allocation of power and resources.²⁶ It is a colonial problem in which the distinction between colonist and native is conveniently expressed in terms of religion.²⁷ It is not a coincidence that the fighting in August 1969 broke out on the anniversary of the raising of the siege of Londonderry in 1689 by William of Orange. These facts must be kept in mind when considering the approach that the British Army took as they entered the province as enforcers of the peace.

The British Army moved in to separate the two communities and then sought to assist in creating the conditions that would allow a return to peaceful coexistence.²⁸ This mission was very close to that given to the Commander of the 1st Armored Division in the spring of 1993. It closely resembles many situations today into which the United States Army may be committed. The actions taken by the British government and Army in Northern Ireland will help illustrate the proper application of the elements of operational design.

SECTION 3: ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

"There is no good sending troops if the cause of the riots are not dealt with."

Prime Minister Harold Wilson²⁹

Before attempting to develop a comprehensive peace enforcement campaign plan one must first consider the elements of

operational design. The first realization when faced with such a situation is that the cold war paradigm of immediately responding to any situation with combat forces capable of quick and decisive victory no longer applies.³⁰ Relying on a doctrine that posits overwhelming force will only lead to problems for the operational planner. Peace enforcement requires the planner to modify how he thinks about operational design.

While cold war doctrines and philosophies may not apply in peace enforcement missions the elements of operational design must still be considered. The campaign plan is the commander's vision of how the operation is to unfold. As such, the planner needs to evaluate the elements of operational design prior to the development of his plan.³¹ These elements are beneficial in that they allow the planner to determine the broad perspectives of the campaign. They provide a linkage between the seemingly isolated events of an operational plan. These principle elements are the concepts of: center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation and culminating points. The planner must understand these concepts and know the differences between applying them in conventional warfare and applying them to peace enforcement.

The most important element of operational design is the **center of gravity**. Closely aligned with this concept is the notion of **decisive points**. In On War Carl von Clausewitz defines the center of gravity as; "The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."³² This definition applies equally well to conventional combat and peace enforcement; though in conventional combat the center of gravity is likely going to be more identifiable. The center of gravity in peace enforcement is not as obvious because it is not necessarily on the battlefield. It includes the political and social systems of the country

involved. It may also be partially psychological because of the close link between the thoughts and views of a people and the nature of the society in which they live.³³

Closely linked to the center of gravity is the concept of decisive points. They are closely aligned because decisive points are the keys to getting at the center of gravity. The United States Army defines decisive points as: "Points that provide the commander with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action."³⁴ As such, this concept must also be considered when planning a peace enforcement operation.

The British experience in Northern Ireland and their attempts to determine and influence the center of gravity will help illustrate this concept. The initial problem for the British Army was that they entered the situation of Northern Ireland very quickly without time to properly develop a plan. Additionally, they carried along their experiences of other colonial peace enforcement missions. However, these experiences would prove not to apply in a western country composed of British citizens. Earmarking a "no-cross" line and shooting anyone who crosses was simply not applicable in Northern Ireland.

The initial mission for the British Army was to separate the two belligerents that local law enforcement officials could no longer control. Therefore, they focused their efforts solely on the security issue. They believed that the radical Catholic and Protestant fringe organizations were the problem.³⁵ In other words the first center of gravity identified was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). At the same time the British Army correctly identified their own center of gravity to be their neutrality. With these two centers of gravity determined they developed a plan to stop the violence. The British felt that if

the IRA could be crushed and if they remained neutral in the application of force then there would be an end to the violence.

The British Army was able to protect their own center of gravity throughout the spring of 1970. During this initial period the Catholic population welcomed the British Army as a force that would protect them from the violent Protestant mobs.³⁶ The Army stopped the greater part of the violence and established relative peace by the end of 1969. The British had eliminated a major source of Catholic discontent by banning the Protestant biased "B-Special" police auxiliaries and by protecting the general population. This acceptance by the Catholic population had hindered the IRA in its efforts to rally the Catholic population to their cause. Without the support of the people the IRA could not operate effectively. The Army was also able to control Protestant violence through an even-handed approach in dealing with Protestants and Catholics alike. Although the British prevented large-scale violence they made no attempts to alter the root causes of the violence.

The British enjoyed success in protecting their own center of gravity and in attacking a decisive point by eliminating the legitimacy of the IRA. At the same time they had not correctly identified the center of gravity of the Catholic and Protestant communities. As such they continued to concentrate on the symptom rather than the problem. This failure to identify the belligerent centers of gravity eventually led to the destruction of their own center of gravity. This happened through a series of incidents in April through July 1970.

Their first error came on 1 April 1970 during a riot between Catholics and Protestants. During that riot Catholic youths injured several soldiers by throwing stones and petrol bombs. This incident prompted the British Army commander, General

Ian Freeland, to issue his "get tough" policy. This policy stated that anyone found throwing petrol bombs would be shot dead. This immediately alienated the Catholic population as they perceived that this action was aimed solely at them. The next incident came on 27 June when a group of Protestants attempted to burn Saint Matthews Catholic Church in Belfast. A group of Catholic IRA members barricaded themselves in the church and a seven-hour shoot-out ensued. During that time the local community requested Army or Royal Ulster Constabulary (local police) support. That support never came as the Army had no forces available to respond.³⁷ The IRA members were able to protect the church; thereby gaining a significant amount of popular legitimacy as the protectors of the Catholic population. After this incident the Catholic community felt that they could no longer rely on the British Army for protection. This disillusionment of the Catholic community was reinforced substantially six days later when the British Army conducted a series of aggressive searches in the primarily Catholic Falls Road area.

These incidents solidified the belief in the mind of the Catholic community that the British Army was no longer neutral. The constant searching of Catholic homes, the lack of consideration for civilians, and the failure to apply the same standard to the Protestants turned the Catholic community against the British Army.³⁸ The British Army had compromised their neutrality and therefore their center of gravity. These actions were counterproductive because they pushed the Catholic community into the arms of the IRA. Put differently, instead of attacking the center of gravity of the Catholic community they reinforced it by pushing the people and the IRA together. This popular support in the Catholic community would allow the IRA to operate with

impunity in many areas of Northern Ireland and thereby increase, rather than reduce, the amount of violence.

The British further compromised their center of gravity by implementing the policy of Internment. This policy, invoked in the summer of 1971, allowed the army to arrest and inter subjects without trial. During the first "round-up" of suspects the British Army arrested over 350 Irish Catholics and not one Protestant. This was conducted even though the Protestants were responsible for as many deaths as the IRA. Internment was a disaster, further increasing violence in the province. During the four months before Internment there were eight killings. During the four months following Internment that figure was 114 including thirty British soldiers.³⁹

On 31 January 1972, "Bloody Sunday", the British Army killed thirteen unarmed Catholic protestors. That event made it entirely obvious to the Catholics that the British Army was no longer their protector. Bloody Sunday changed the face of operations in Northern Ireland. Having failed at peace enforcement, the British Army became an army designed to eliminate an insurgency rather than a neutral force imposed between two warring belligerents.

In Northern Ireland three distinct centers of gravity were apparent. Had the British Army successfully identified these centers of gravity it is possible that they would not still be in Northern Ireland twenty-six years later. The British center of gravity, as originally identified, was its ability to remain neutral and therefore maintain its legitimacy. They understood this point but their inability to determine the belligerent centers of gravity caused them to compromise their own. The center of gravity for the Catholics was the tenuous link between the general Catholic population and its radical violent fringe,

the IRA. Had the British realized this fact they could have kept them separate, as they did in 1969 by fair and impartial treatment. This separation might have caused the IRA to wither on the vine because the viability of the IRA derives from their being able to hide among the Catholic population.⁴⁰ Without a friendly population in which to reside they would have no support and would eventually become ineffectual. This would have been similar to what happened to the IRA after their unsuccessful campaign between 1956 and 1962. The center of gravity for the Protestants was their determination to remain part of the United Kingdom; they were proud of their Unionist tradition -- a tradition that they felt they would lose as a minority in a unified Irish Republic.

The situation in Northern Ireland also provides many examples of decisive points in a peace enforcement campaign. The rights of the Catholic population was a primary decisive point. If this population had been protected and offered further political and economic rights they would never have sided with the IRA. Law and order was another decisive point in the campaign. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) claimed bias and discrimination against the Catholics by the local police forces. The British successfully won this decisive point by superceding the Royal Ulster Constabulary and eliminating the "B-Specials". Economic aid for the poor was also a decisive point. Eliminating the unemployment among young Catholic men, which ran as high as 27%, would have made fewer men readily available for the IRA. The establishment of a strong unbiased government at Stormont was also a decisive point which might have provided needed stability in the region. Finally, an understanding that the military is not the final and only solution was a decisive point missed by the British government.

This analysis of the British experience in Northern Ireland illustrates several important aspects of the nature of centers of gravity and decisive points in a peace enforcement campaign. First, the concept and determination of the center of gravity is just as applicable in peace enforcement as it is in conventional warfare. Second, there exists a likelihood of at least three centers of gravity instead of the normal two. Third, there is the necessity to consider the social, political, economic, and military aspects of the situation when determining the center of gravity. Fourth, the most likely friendly center of gravity is one's own neutrality. Once this neutrality is compromised the force loses its legitimacy; and hence it can no longer function as a peace enforcer. Fifth, the link between the radical fringe, which is causing most of the violence, and the general population is critical and typically may be the belligerent center of gravity. Sixth, overwhelming decisive power will most likely not cause the enemy center of gravity to fall and will possibly have the opposite effect. Finally, a thorough knowledge of the history, politics, and social situation is essential to avoid attacking a symptom rather than the cause of the disease. This list is certainly not complete but does offer some considerations for the operational planner.

The second element of operational design, **lines of operation**, is much less distinct in peace enforcement operations than it is in conventional operations. In conventional terms "lines of operation define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy."⁴¹ The noted military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini further defined lines of operation by subdividing them into exterior and interior lines. Interior lines of operation allow one to concentrate faster than the enemy can oppose the concentration. Exterior lines lead to

the opposite result.⁴² In conventional terms these lines are geometric in nature and connect the force with its base of operations. In contrast, in peace enforcement this geometrical definition may not apply in the literal sense.

In peace enforcement, lines of operation will most likely be non-physical in nature. They are manifested in political, social, and economic terms, instead of being strictly military in nature.⁴³ They may even be as problematic as the linkage between the peace enforcement force and its supporting national will. From the perspective of the United States interior lines may exist when the peace enforcement force enjoys the support of the American people.⁴⁴ The United States involvement, and subsequent withdrawal, from Somalia clearly illustrates this point.

The IRA planned to force the British Army on exterior lines by making it too costly for them to stay in Northern Ireland. By concentrating on the British Army rather than the actual enemy, the Protestants, the IRA hoped to demonstrate that the security situation was hopeless. They forced the British Army to operate on exterior lines by increasing the level of violence. This in turn caused the British to increase their pressure on the Catholic communities; and this then increased the legitimacy of the IRA and put the British on exterior lines. Although they did not force the British Army out of Northern Ireland the IRA did force the British to make sizeable increases in their Army. By July 1972 the British Army had committed over 22,000 soldiers to Northern Ireland; this commitment inhibited the United Kingdom from meeting other commitments around the world and within NATO.⁴⁵

The British experience illustrates that the planner must consider the problem of lines of operation before attempting to develop a campaign plan. The intervening force must attempt to avoid being forced onto exterior lines by the belligerents. When

considering lines of operation in a peace enforcement campaign, the most important point is that these lines are most likely not going to be physical in nature. They are more complicated than the simple linkage between the unit in contact and its base of operations. Lines of operation are going to be much more ambiguous and involve political, social, and economic factors. They are also more closely linked to the center of gravity than they are in conventional operations. When deciding lines of operation consideration must be given to national support, use of force, and enforcement techniques. Finally, inappropriate violence against one belligerent or the other will invariably put the peace enforcer on exterior lines.

The third and final element of operational design is the idea of **culminating points**. In conventional terms the culminating point is where the strength of the attacker no longer exceeds that of the defender.⁴⁶ In peace enforcement operations political and economic events may overshadow military success and make the arrival of a culminating point more difficult to discern.⁴⁷ These points tend to be more subtle and lack any method of determination. Nonetheless, for the peace enforcer the culminating point will often be obvious. Frequently, once the peace enforcing unit loses its perceived neutrality it will culminate. For the belligerents their culmination is also closely linked to their center of gravity. In the case of the IRA they would have culminated had they been unable to rely on the support of the indigenous Catholic population.

The IRA understood this concept and attempted to bring about the culmination of the British Army by making their efforts too costly. The IRA's plan from the start was to use selective terror to erode morale and impose costs and to thereby persuade the British that it was too expensive to hold on to Northern

Ireland.⁴⁸ The IRA also hoped that attacks against the British Army would force them to invoke more drastic measures such as internment and eventually direct rule. These measures would make the main conflict between the "Irish people" and the British state. This would add legitimacy to the IRA and force the British to culminate. If the British Army withdrew the Protestants would then have to deal directly with the IRA for control of the province.⁴⁹

The British Army began to culminate when it compromised its own center of gravity by initiating its "get tough" policy in the summer of 1970. This policy might have avoided culmination for the British had it been waged equally against both the Protestants and the Catholics. The British failure to pursue a truly impartial "get tough" policy, combined with the Saint Matthews Church incident and the Falls curfew, spelled culmination for the British Army as peace enforcers.

It is apparent from the start that the British planners never considered culminating points in their analysis of the situation. A clear example of culmination brought on by the failure to plan adequately occurred in Ballymacarett. By December 1971 the British had cleared the IRA out of this Republican area of Belfast. However, there was no political mechanism in place to move into Ballymacarett with assistance at this critical moment.⁵⁰ There were no plans as to what to do once an area was cleared of IRA violence. This was the time for the civil government to move in and restore facilities and generally show the Catholic population that they cared. The government failed to do this and within six weeks the IRA returned. This incident in Ballymacarett made it obvious that the British Army had culminated. They had neither plans nor provisions to link the military and political plans in Northern Ireland. The military had accomplished its

mission but because the plan did not call for any political or governmental action they had in fact culminated as a peace enforcement body.

These actions illustrate what the operational planner must avoid; namely, the early culmination of the peace enforcement unit. The British culmination in Northern Ireland, and the failure to anticipate or identify it, was due to many factors. First, the British culminated primarily due to the loss of their own neutrality and due to an inability to link political with military actions. Second, use of excessive force disproportionately against one belligerent resulted in the culmination of the peace enforcement unit. Third, a culminating point resulted when the support from home for the operation lessened because of the costs involved. Finally, the belligerents involved did not culminate because they did not believe that their quality of life would improve by ending the violence.

This analysis suggests that the operational planner of a peace enforcement operation must understand how to apply the elements of operational design before developing his campaign plan. All the major elements of operational design can be, and must be, applied when preparing a plan for peace enforcement. The operational planner must develop measures of evaluation and must inform decision makers as to the criteria of the particular conflict.⁵¹ Put differently, the planner must understand the nuances of peace enforcement operations and how they apply to the particular situation in question. The British experience in Northern Ireland highlights some of these nuances; but, these must be taken in the context of the specific situation.

Nevertheless, there are numerous important conclusions that can be gleaned from the previous discussion. For example, it is important to realize when determining centers of gravity that

there are often going to be more than two. Also, in all likelihood these centers of gravity will not be military in nature. The concept of perceived neutrality runs through all three elements of operational design and must be a dominant feature of the plan. The planner must remember that military action alone will not successfully destroy the enemy center of gravity. The lines of operation are not physical, and may be as ambiguous as the linkage to support from home. Finally, culminating points in the operation focus on neutrality, legitimacy and the political-military linkage.

After understanding these particular nuances of peace enforcement the planner must then take these abstract ideas and formulate them into a campaign plan. This campaign plan must as a minimum include: the identification of the problem, determination of an end state, and the methods to be used that will link these two points.

SECTION 4: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

"Unless an end-state can be articulated along with a plan how to get there, intervention by third parties may do more harm than good."⁵²

Stephen J. Stedman

After considering the ideas of the center of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points the planner can then formulate a campaign plan. The campaign plan is the commander's vision of the sequence of operations that will achieve the strategic objectives.⁵³ To attain these strategic objectives the commander applies the concepts of operational design to the framework of a campaign plan.

Current United States doctrine specifies certain elements that must be considered when developing a campaign plan. These elements are the components of operational design and they build upon the concepts identified in Section 3. Joint warfighting doctrine specifies these elements as: objective, sequence of operations, applications of resources, and theater operating systems.⁵⁴ However, they must be adapted to the uniqueness of peace enforcement before they can be applied. For peace enforcement operations these elements should be changed to include: identification of the problem, determination of the objectives and end-state, and establishment of the methods to be employed.

These changes are necessary because items that are obvious in conventional warfare tend to be not so apparent in peace enforcement. In conventional war identification of the problem is normally self-evident. For example, the problem in Desert Storm was that Iraq had violated the territorial integrity of Kuwait. In Cyprus, on the other hand, the problem is not quite as clear as it was in Southwest Asia in 1991. In peace enforcement the problem is inherently much more complex and deserves special attention. Determination of the end-state is very critical to both operations; however, that end-state is much more difficult to determine in a peace enforcement environment. Therefore, it deserves special attention while developing the campaign plan. This section will attempt to take these transposed elements of operational design and apply them to a campaign plan.

Identification of the problem is perhaps the most important step in development of the campaign plan in a peace enforcement operation. The problem must be clearly identified early on because most of the plan will flow from this point. It is also critical to identify the problem clearly and succinctly so

that subordinates can understand the purpose of the mission. Attempting to establish peace between warring factions without understanding the full scope of the problem is like treating the symptom rather than the disease.⁵⁵ Simply eliminating the fighting between warring parties may be an example of a tactical victory but it does not ensure that the problem will be solved. It will most likely also be necessary to remove the underlying causes of the instability through political or economic reform.

In Northern Ireland the determination of the problem has been very difficult for all parties involved. The former Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, John Lynch, listed two primary causes for the conflict in Ulster. First, he stated that the border created in 1920 had no geographic or historic basis. The second problem was the permanent control of the Ulster government by Protestant Unionists.⁵⁶ Civil rights activist and Member of Parliament Bernadette Devlin has asserted that the problem is the gulf between the haves and have nots.⁵⁷ Some believe that the root of the problem is the Protestant refusal to compromise by allowing political power sharing with the Catholic minority.⁵⁸ The British Army believed that the problem was one of security and economics. Still others claim that it is due to deep seated social and political factors.⁵⁹ One point that is clear to any student of the crisis is that the ostensible religious basis of the conflict is not the real problem.

It is apparent that determining the root of the problem between warring factions is difficult at best. Even in such a researched, studied, and debated area as Northern Ireland there is no consensus as to the actual problem. Determination of the problem will be greatly compounded in such areas as Rwanda or Bosnia-Herzegovina because planners will be involved in a compressed planning cycle. Even in such very confused situations

it is essential that an attempt be made to define the problem. Adjustments can then be made from that point as the situation develops. In Northern Ireland the British Army did attempt to define the problem but unfortunately they assumed the problem to be primarily security. This may not have been altogether incorrect as an initial assumption; it is certainly one that is frequently made by the military. Unfortunately for the British they failed to alter their interpretation of the problem as the situation developed. The main problem in Northern Ireland is not simply security. It is a situation of have nots (Catholics) attempting to gain some basic rights (voting, equality, jobs, and education) while the haves (Protestants) are afraid of losing their current positions of power and influence. This is a broad interpretation but it is one that would have better guided the British efforts.

In situations like Northern Ireland there are several key points that one must consider when attempting to identify the problem of two ethnic factions fighting each other. The obvious point is that the problem is going to be complex; involving historical, political, social, and economic aspects. It is not simply a military problem of two groups fighting each other. Another item to keep in mind is that everyone will not necessarily agree on the actual problem. Finally, politicians and the military will most likely define the problem differently.

The planner must keep in mind that the ostensible problem is probably not the real issue. Religious differences in Northern Ireland serve as an example of this. What is important is that the problem must be identified before developing a plan. The problem should be stated broadly and then refined as more information is obtained. Then the planner can begin to shift his

attention to developing a plan to solve, or at least alleviate, the problem.

The next phase in developing the campaign plan is to decide the objectives and the end state for the campaign. This determination is particularly important in peace enforcement due to the possibility of "mission creep"; i.e. the addition of unplanned requirements upon a force in these situations. Due to the political nature of peace enforcement this is sometimes inevitable; however, a clearly defined end state can help this phenomenon from occurring.⁶⁰

Another idiosyncrasy of peace enforcement operations is that the end state is not normally the status quo ante bellum. In inter-state war, on the other hand, this is commonly the case. In peace enforcement it is usually necessary to remove the factors that led to the conflict thereby making a return to the way things were before impossible.⁶¹ Additionally, the end state in peace enforcement operations is often settlement rather than victory. The goal is to establish the conditions necessary to get the belligerents to the negotiating table. Therefore, the use of military forces will most likely not be decisive. The application of military force is designed to achieve such goals as protection of non-combatants, reinforcing the legitimacy of the government, or to secure freedom of action. The ultimate goal is the separation of the belligerents and not the destruction of one or more of the participants.⁶² So it is easy to see that the determination of an end state is very difficult, but also very essential.

In theory, the British Army was in Northern Ireland to buy time and create a degree of stability to allow for a political decision. As such they determined their end state to be the

elimination of hostilities in Northern Ireland. James Callaghan, the Home Secretary in Westminster, echoed this when he said;

The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland has been instructed to take all the necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and citizen to restore law and order. Troops will be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished. This is a limited operation. . . .⁶³

That sounded well and good to the officers and men of the British Army but it had two inherent problems. First, the Home Secretary identified the wrong problem; and second he failed to identify a proper end state. To say that the end state is to restore law and order is simply not enough.

With such an end state it is no wonder that the British Army remains in Northern Ireland today.⁶⁴ In reality the Army was committed without an end state, objective, or even a goal other than to bring peace to the region. British politicians wanted to return to the pre-August 1969 life in Northern Ireland. Their end state made no attempt to eliminate the rift between Catholics and Protestants; it sought only to end the violence between them.⁶⁵ Planners must insist on a well-defined end state that helps to solve the existing problems.

Lacking an adequate end state the British Army attempted several times to determine one for themselves. In 1970 the army established two objectives; the defeat of the terrorists and the creation of a political structure that would be acceptable to both sides and that would allow the province to be governed properly.⁶⁶ The problem with these two objectives was that the British government did not support them and hence there was no way that they could be achieved. In essence, there was no political-military linkage in the end state. Frustrated with this problem, in 1971 the Army saw their objective as purely military; the complete elimination of the IRA.⁶⁷ Again this was a hollow

objective as it could never be achieved and even if it were achieved it would not solve the problem.

By December 1971 the British Army was aware of the lack of a long term political objective or end state. They therefore, began to push the British government for Direct Rule. They felt that this would centralize control of the police, the army, and the political situation.⁶⁸ The British Army hoped that this centralization would allow for the determination of an achievable end state. Direct rule also did not solve the problem for the Army because it came three years too late. As such, the Army was reacting to the situation rather than conducting a planned and organized campaign to bring about a resolution to the problem.

The British experience and their inability to determine an acceptable end state for their operation has illustrated several key points that are important for the operational planner to remember. First, it is necessary to decide on an end state before the commitment of forces. The British sent their Army into Northern Ireland and then attempted to set their objectives as the situation developed. It was a reactive process rather than a proactive one. If the strategic guidance does not provide a proper end state then the planner or commander must determine one. Then the National Command Authority must be involved in its implementation. The British Army initially had the proper end state but without the support and acceptance of the policy makers it was impossible to attain. The planner must also return to the centers of gravity determined in the planning process and ensure that the end state focuses on these centers. The end state must be flexible and evolve as the situation changes but it should also be concrete enough to avoid mission creep.

Military planners and politicians alike must avoid the tendency to simply state the status quo ante bellum as the proper

end state. In a peace enforcement situation involving ethnic, religious, or political animosities such a solution is untenable. The end state should focus on setting the conditions for political, economic, or social reforms. Settlement, and not victory, is the normal end state for a peace enforcement operation. Finally, the concepts of operational design should play an integral role in determination of the end state. If the end state does not neutralize the belligerent centers of gravity and protect one's own then it will fail.

After identification of the problem and determination of the end state the planner must consider which methods to implement. The determination of the proper methods involves the sequencing of operations and the application of resources. It not only involves deciding what methods are most appropriate but also includes the phasing and development of branches and sequels.⁶⁹ This choice of methods primarily involves decisions when the use of violence is appropriate. This choice is in part determined by the centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points. It is a very delicate decision and must be a balance between force protection and the necessity to remain neutral. One key point the planner must remember is that once the peace enforcer becomes involved in war they have failed in their intended purpose.⁷⁰

The British government's attempt to bring peace to Northern Ireland can be broken down into six phases between 1969 and 1979. Each phase provides an example of the different methods employed by the British Army and thus offers an insight into which worked and which did not. The first phase of the British operations, the "honeymoon" period, lasted from their initial entry in August 1969 through April 1970. The honeymoon period refers to that time when the British Army enforced the peace

equally between Catholics and Protestants. In this initial phase their efforts failed because there was no attempt to implement a political solution once there was relative peace in the area.

The second phase consisted of a hard lined campaign in an effort to force the IRA to capitulate. It lasted from the announcement of the "heavy-handed" approach in April 1970 through February 1972. It included such methods as increased violence against civilians, internment, curfews, and regular searches of Catholic neighborhoods. Such violent and oppressive measures accomplished exactly the opposite of what the British Army had hoped for. Internment focused entirely on the Catholic population and thereby compromised the British Army's center of gravity. It was a tactical success but proved to be an operational disaster. The policy of internment pushed the IRA and Catholic population together thereby allowing the IRA to increase both its legitimacy and power.

This violent repression against the Catholic population came to a head in early in 1972. On 30 January the Civil Rights Association decided to conduct a peaceful march in Derry. In that area most of the problems encountered by the Army were from an organization called the Young Derry Hooligans. These were unemployed young Catholics who made life difficult for the British Army by continually harassing soldiers. Although not stated in the operations order the Army intended to teach the Young Derry Hooligans a lesson. In essence the operation was to be punitive in nature.⁷¹

The march was peaceful until about 4:00 P.M. when the hooligans became separated from the marchers and the elite men of the 1st Parachute Regiment (1 Para) moved in. There are many different accounts of what happened next but within twenty minutes thirteen Catholics were dead and another thirteen injured. Seven

of the dead were under nineteen years of age and all were unarmed.⁷² The action was tactically successful but operationally and politically disastrous. Catholics now had no doubt that the British Army was simply an extension of the Protestant cause. The British Army was no longer effective as a peace enforcement unit: it had chosen sides.

Because of "Bloody Sunday" the British Army entered the third phase and again changed their methods of operation. This phase lasted from February to August 1972 and consisted of a "hands-off" approach to the problem. This phase also coincided with the implementation of Direct Rule. As a result "no-go" areas sprang up and violence between Catholics and Protestants increased. The British Army was unable to operate in these "no-go" areas where either the IRA, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), or the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) became the law. This attempt at lessening the presence of the British Army was also unsuccessful. On 21 July 1972 the IRA conducted a bombing raid in Belfast where twenty-two bombs were set off simultaneously in a one mile radius. The Secretary of State William Whitelaw then declared that the "no-go" areas must be reoccupied and dominated by the Army.⁷³ This brought about a new phase for the British Army and another approach to the problem.

Phase four began with Operation Motorman. It was to be the largest operation yet waged in Northern Ireland. The aim was to establish a continuing presence in all areas in order to neutralize the extremist ability to influence events until a political settlement could be achieved. Probably the most important aspect of this operation was that the British Army remembered their lesson after internment and the soldiers moved into Protestant areas as well.⁷⁴ This operation succeeded because it linked military action to a political solution. Unfortunately

it was done about three years too late and after the British were no longer viewed as a neutral party. The political solution was to create a power-sharing Executive Council composed of six Protestant and five Catholic representatives.

This power-sharing solution also failed because it ignored the Protestant center of gravity. The Council took power on 1 January 1974 and lasted until mid-May of that year. In May 1974 the Ulster Workers Council began a strike in protest against the power-sharing cabinet. This strike brought the province to its knees by closing down the infrastructure of Northern Ireland. The Catholic members of the Council pushed the Army to intervene, but they refused. The Army needed to take some action to show the Protestant leaders that it would not be intimidated; but unfortunately that firmness was never shown.⁷⁵ As a result the Executive Council stepped down and Direct Rule returned.

Phase five lasted from the downfall of the Executive Council through April 1976. This phase began after the IRA announced a cease-fire against the British Army on 1 January 1975. The British Army acknowledged this cease-fire and decreased their operations. On the surface this seemed to be working with only one soldier being killed during the first six months of the cease-fire. Beneath this surface tranquility sectarian violence increased sharply. By September 1975 one-hundred ninety-six civilians had died; an increase of thirty-seven over the same period a year earlier.⁷⁶ Again the British methods proved ineffective and in early 1976 the Army began to increase operations against the IRA.

Phase six began in May 1976 as the British Army decided that the police should play a larger role in maintaining the peace. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was to assume the security mission with the British Army taking on a secondary role. This

initially sparked a new wave of killings between the IRA, the UVF, the UDA, and the RUC. This latest round of bloodshed in Northern Ireland ran its course as the IRA reorganized to face this new threat. Their reorganization into small autonomous units proved disastrous to the British. Two separate incidents took place on 27 August 1979 that caused much consternation within the British Army. First, the IRA killed Earl Mountbatten while he was on vacation in Ireland. A few hours later the IRA ambushed and killed eighteen British soldiers at Warrenpoint. This was the worst disaster suffered by the British in Northern Ireland and the worst 1 Para had suffered since it parachuted into Arnhem in the Second World War.⁷⁷ Once again the methods employed by the British Army were not succeeding.

All six phases of the British operations in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1979 were a result of changing their methods to enforce the peace. All six changes ended in failure. The various methodologies all stemmed from external pressures rather than a deliberately planned proactive policy or plan. There were many methods the British could have employed that might have provided better results.

Initially, they could have offered a strong neutral government that was acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants. It was impossible to offer the Irish Catholics independence, as they desired, but some form of stronger neutral government may have at least given them something to hope for in the future. Another method may have been to first bring an end to the violence. The British achieved this by the end of 1969 but had no plan of action after the establishment of peace. The next step should have been to substitute equitable and desired treatment for the discrimination of the past. This would make the Protestant and Catholics citizens less likely to support the violence of the

extremist organizations. Without support of the people the extremist organizations could no longer function properly. Finally, because it is very difficult for the peace enforcer to become the peacekeeper, a United Nations peacekeeping force should have replaced the British Army.⁷⁸

An analysis of the methods that the British employed shows that there are many options available to the operational planner. At the same time, there are also several key points one must keep in mind when deciding which methods to employ. The most important point is that the heavy-handed approach may bring about tactical success but will often result in operational failure. Reducing the level of violence in the region in question will help lower tensions. People may then begin to see that life may be good after all. It will also make the violence by the extremists obvious for what it is and tend to alienate the extremist from the population.⁷⁹ This then links back to the center of gravity for the belligerents as noted earlier.

The planner must keep in mind that the military objective is to suppress terrorism to the point where violence will not prevent any activity of the government. In other words the methods employed must be chosen so as to set the conditions for success. It is also important that the chosen methods do not compromise one's own center of gravity. The method must also avoid any perceived prejudice to one side or the other. A good technique currently employed by the British in Northern Ireland is based on a strategy of reassurance, attrition, and deterrence. This method involves the reassurance of the local population, deterrence of terrorist activity and the attrition of the terrorist. Reassurance is the key element for without it there is no possibility for political progress. At the same time reassurance is not possible without attrition and deterrence.⁸⁰

Although violence is the primary method by which the military accomplishes its normal mission, in peace enforcement such violence should be avoided. If violence is necessary it should be introduced gradually, be narrowly focused, and be terminated at the first opportunity. Additionally, violence or force must be applied together with diplomatic efforts.⁸¹ It should never be punitive or indiscriminate in nature such as 1 Para's action on Bloody Sunday. Such violence does nothing except incite the population by creating martyrs.

The employment of violence should be such as to allow the belligerents an opportunity to deescalate the situation. Such controlled force prevents violence from escalating all out of proportion. One example of such coercive violence could be the use of illumination rounds to display the capability of attacking the belligerent with artillery. Another example would be the use of pinpoint munitions to destroy some specific object; this would also demonstrate to the belligerent the capabilities that exist. These are only some of the non-lethal means the operational planner must consider when developing the campaign plan. Again the key issue concerning the use of violence is that it must be linked to a well developed political and social plan.⁸²

This quick overview has offered some possible solutions for a campaign plan. Identifying the problem, defining the end state, and deciding the appropriate methods are the key issues. They are derived from the elements of operational design and will assist the operational planner in the development of a campaign plan. The differences between applying these design elements in conventional war and peace keeping are obvious. This is principally because designing a campaign plan to avoid violence is unique to peace operations. Hopefully, the nuances and problems with the British Army's attempt to enforce peace without an end

state or proper plan have shown how critical it is that these elements be taken into account out well in advance.

SECTION 5: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.

*George Orwell, 1984*⁸³

As this paper is being written the United States Army's 1st Armored Division remains prepared to move into Bosnia-Herzegovina. It must be assumed that over the past two years the division planners have examined the situation closely enough to be fully prepared for what may lie ahead. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the only area of the world in which the United States Army may one day be committed. A quick examination of the newspaper shows that Rwanda's ethnic problems have spilled over into Burundi and this is only one example of the volatility of the sub-Saharan region of the African Continent.

Eastern Europe and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States remain areas that could sink into intra-state ethnic conflict in the future. The availability of nuclear weapons makes these areas particularly important. Ethnic conflict in the Trans-Caucasus region also continues to smolder under Russian oppression. One cannot forget that Cambodia and other countries in South-East Asia remain unstable and verge on eruption. There is no doubt that intra-state conflict is on the rise throughout the world. Northern Ireland was simply the first of a number of such intra-state conflicts. As the sole remaining super-power there is little doubt that the United States will become involved somewhere in the world in a situation requiring

peace enforcement. It is not the job of the soldiers to decide if this is right or wrong; nor is it their place to decide where to become involved; but, it is certainly their job to be as prepared as possible should their presence be required.

This paper has not provided any absolutes for those who may someday be required to plan a peace enforcement operation. Its purpose was to highlight some of the operational factors that planners should consider. It contains no perfect answers but hopefully serves to enlighten the mind of the operational planner. The British experience in Northern Ireland has highlighted some of the specific nuances and particularities of peace enforcement. There are other case studies that could have been used; however, the case of Northern Ireland typifies the sort of situation that the United States may one day find itself involved. At the same time the British experience must be taken for what it is and not as rules that can be blindly obeyed. Deriving "lessons learned" and applying them to a different situation is inherently dangerous and must be avoided. However, the British experience in Northern Ireland does offer some good insights into the complexity of planning a peace enforcement operation.

What is important is for the planner to grasp the concept of peace enforcement and to understand how it differs from planning high to mid intensity conflict. The lack of understanding among today's planners concerning peace operations is quite evident. A recent planning exercise at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas bore out this fact: In this exercise planners focused more energy positioning a "hammer force" for a peacekeeping operation than determining the nature of the situation. Such a "heavy-handed" approach suggests a possible lack of understanding among today's planners and the need for more study in this area.

The planner must also understand that peace enforcement is an entirely separate operation from other types of peace operations such as peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy; and that therefore, one has to approach the subject from a different perspective. It is also very important to throw off the conventional war paradigms so deeply ingrained in one's mind. Furthermore, the planner must understand the belligerents' perspectives on the war and must formulate a campaign plan that takes these perspectives into account. The planner must also be aware that the military is not the whole answer to the problem; that any lasting solution needs to consider the political, economic, and social aspects of the situation.

Only with an understanding of the items and issues raised in this paper will one be prepared to develop a plan for a peace enforcement mission. The military may not desire to perform such missions but it is certain that they must be prepared to perform them.

APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
1169	Norman invasion of Ireland.
1366	Statutes of Kilkenny adopted to prevent the Normans from becoming too Irish.
1510 - 1550	European reformation, however, Ireland remains Catholic.
1565 - 1567	Shane O'Neill uprising.
1591 - 1603	Uprising of O'Neill and O'Donnell supported by the Spanish ends in defeat at Kinsale.
1603	English law extended over Ireland and Belfast founded.
1609	Plantation of Ulster Begins.
1641 - 1652	Peasant uprising, Cromwell suppresses revolt.
1688 - 1691	Jacobite War, William of Orange defeats James II, the last attempt to have a Catholic King sit on the English throne.
1695 - 1725	Penal laws put into effect.
1791 - 1798	United Irish Movement aided by French and defeated by the British Army.
1795	Orange Order established.
1798	Battle of Vinegar Hill, death of Wolfe Tone.
1800	Ireland becomes part of United Kingdom.
1835	British army restores order in Belfast after Orange parades incite riots by Catholics.
1847 - 1848	Potato famine and Young Ireland rising put down.
1886	First Home Rule Bill defeated.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
1913	Ulster Volunteer Force formed in opposition to growing support for Home Rule bill.
1914	Third Home Rule Bill passes.
1916	Easter uprising put down by British army.
1919	Irish parliament (Dail) formed, guerrilla war begun against the British Black and Tans, IRA formed.
1920	Government of Ireland Act declared partitioning island into Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. Act not recognized by Dail.
1922 - 1923	Irish civil war. Ended with acceptance of partitioning of Ireland as a temporary fix to problems in the north.
1932 - 1935	Sectarian rioting in Belfast.
1937	Irish Free State adopts constitution and asserts claim to entire island.
1949	Westminster formalizes "Loyalist veto" barring reunification of Ireland except with the consent of Northern Ireland majority. Republic of Ireland declared.
1956 - 1962	IRA border campaign against Northern Ireland.
Oct 1968	Civil rights march in Londonderry results in first acts of violence between Protestants and Catholics.
Apr 1969	After sabotage of public facilities British Army begins to guard them.
12-14 Aug 1969	Orange parades in Londonderry result in widespread rioting. Battle of the Bogside.
15 Aug 1969	British troops committed to restore order.
Aug-Dec 1969	Peace line established in Belfast by British Army, IRA splits into two factions, the Provisionals and Officials.
Apr 1970	First conflict between Irish Catholics and British troops. British lose credibility and no longer viewed as neutral by Catholics.
Jul 1970	British conduct raids in Lower Falls area of Belfast to recover arms and impose curfew.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
Aug 1970 - Apr 1971	Major changes in military and civilian leadership in Northern Ireland. Henry Tuzo becomes military commander and Brian Faulkner replaces Chichester-Clark as Prime Minister.
9 Aug 1971	Faulkner begins policy of internment. The IRA is targeted and over 360 arrests are made.
30 Jan 1972	13 civilians killed by British soldiers in Londonderry in "Bloody Sunday" incident.
March 1972	Direct Rule. William Whitelaw appointed first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
21 July 1972	Bloody Friday in Belfast when 22 IRA bombs planted within a one mile radius explode in the city center. Operation Motorman begins in response.
1 Jan 1974	Northern Ireland Executive composed of five Catholics and six Protestants take office in Ulster.
14-29 May 1974	Power workers strike by Protestants in response to Northern Ireland Executive Council and idea of power sharing. Executive Council resigns and Direct Rule returns.
1975	Year of cease-fire by IRA, however, sectarian killings on the rise.
Jan 1976	British officially introduce SAS into Northern Ireland.
May 1976	Royal Ulster Constabulary resurrected and begin to supplant British Army as main force to establish law and uphold peace.
10 June 1977	New security policy announced with the British Army devoted to undercover work and to reinforce police if necessary.
27 Aug 1979	Lord Mountbatten and 18 British soldiers killed in separate incidents as IRA steps up operations.
27 Oct 1980	H-Block hunger strikes begins in an effort to draw attention to situation in Northern Ireland.
5 May 1981	Bobby Sands starves to death in prison. First of 10 prisoners to die on hunger strikes.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
Oct-Nov 1981	IRA bombing campaign in London.
12-17 Jul 1983	Serious Riots in Derry.
17 Dec 1983	Harrods bombing in London
Apr-May 1984	IRA steps up attacks on RUC and UDR.

ENDNOTES

¹Manfred Woerner, "Less threat, but also less peace," Based on the text of a speech in Brussels on September 10, 1993.

²In this report the Secretary General stated; "Consider the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council." This is from, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making, and Peacekeeping," Report of the Secretary General to the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly (June 17, 1992).

³Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), iv-v.

⁴Thomas G. Pope, "From Camouflage Helmets to Blue Berets: The Transition From Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 3 (Autumn 1994): 301.

⁵Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peacekeeping By United Nations Forces From the Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick a. Praeger, 1963), 123.

⁶John B. Hunt, "Thoughts on Peace Support Operations," Military Review LXXIV (October 1994): 78.

⁷Robert Fisk, "How a Peacekeeping Force Took Sides," The Multinational Force in Beirut (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 176-177.

⁸Dennis J. Quinn, ed., Peace Support Operations and the United States Military (Washington D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 106.

⁹Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, 8-12.

¹⁰Additionally thousands more Panamanians lost their homes and millions of dollars worth of damage was caused by post-war looting. Nearly a year after the invasion only 37% of the people believed that the invasion solved more problems than it created. This is summarized from Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert C. Leicht, The New World Order and Army Doctrine (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), 9.

¹¹Field Manual 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990).

¹²With the publication of Field Manual 100-23 the author of Field Manual 100-20 was unsure whether this new manual would be published. This manual is by far better than the 1990 version and is deserving of merit. Field Manual 100-20 Military Operations Other Than War (Draft) (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 3-1 - 3-3.

¹³Hunt, 78.

¹⁴John A. Little, "The Conflict in Ulster," Master's Thesis presented at Wichita State University, 1976, 7.

¹⁵M. E. Collins, Conquest and Consolidation, ed. Margaret MacCurtain (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), 127.

¹⁶Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Middlesex: Penguin Books LTD., 1970), 22.

¹⁷Ibid., 22-28.

¹⁸Gary Maceoin, Northern Ireland Captive of History (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974), 127.

¹⁹Paor, 50-61.

²⁰D. M. Wilson, "Peacemaking: The Effectiveness of British Strategy in Northern Ireland 1969-1972," Master's Thesis presented to the Army Command and General Staff College, 1993, 33-35.

²¹Ibid., 35.

²²Lloyd George offered the Irish negotiators a compromise for something less than a Republic. The negotiators were faced with the decision to sign the agreement that day or negotiations were to be ended followed by immediate resumption of war. They reluctantly signed. This is summarized from Maceoin, 175.

²³Little, 15-19.

²⁴The division of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was obviously planned by England. Ulster contains the nine counties of the north. However, if they separated out the entire province of Ulster it would have had a Catholic majority. So instead they separated out the maximum area that would still offer a Protestant majority. This is from Roger Hull, The Irish Triangle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 82-83.

²⁵Wilson, 45-46.

²⁶Bill McSweeney, "Northern Ireland: A War of Religion?" Conflict 7 (1987): 233-234.

²⁷Paor, 13-14.

²⁸W. J. Miller, "British Experience in Northern Ireland: A Model for Modern Peacemaking," Master's Thesis presented to the Army Command and General Staff College, 1993, 6-7.

²⁹Richard Mansbach, ed. Northern Ireland: Half Century of Partition (New York: Facts on File, 1973), 52-53.

- ³⁰Pope, 328-329.
- ³¹Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces, AFSC PUB 2 (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, 1992), II-3-19.
- ³²Clausewitz, Carl von. On War (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 720.
- ³³Howard L. Dixon. Operational Art in Low Intensity Conflict (Langley, VA: CLIC Papers, 1987), 7-9.
- ³⁴Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 6-7.
- ³⁵Wilson, 114.
- ³⁶Ibid., 79.
- ³⁷Michael Dewar, British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), 45-48.
- ³⁸Hull, 68-69.
- ³⁹Maceoin, 256-257.
- ⁴⁰Robin Eveleigh. Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society (London: Churst and Company, 1978), 68.
- ⁴¹Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 6-7.
- ⁴²Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 474-475.
- ⁴³Dixon, 14.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., 14.
- ⁴⁵Desmond Hamill. Pig in the Middle (London: Methuen, 1985), 118.
- ⁴⁶AFSC PUB 2, II-3-10 thru II-3-12.
- ⁴⁷Dixon, 17.
- ⁴⁸R. Moss. War For The Cities (New York: Coward, McCann and Geohegan, INC., 1972), 34-35.
- ⁴⁹Henry Patterson. "Gerry Adams and the Modernisation of Republicanism" Conflict Quarterly 3 (1990): 10.
- ⁵⁰Eveleigh, 51.
- ⁵¹Dixon, 23-24.
- ⁵²Stephen J. Stedman. "The New Interventionists" Foreign Affairs 72: 1.
- ⁵³AFSC PUB 2, II-3-19.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., II-3-21.

⁵⁵Dixon, 11.

⁵⁶Little, 53.

⁵⁷Ibid., 29.

⁵⁸Ibid., 2.

⁵⁹Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives (London: The Institute For The Study of Conflict, 1982), 44-45.

⁶⁰FM 100-20, 1-13.

⁶¹Pope, 313.

⁶²Miller, 34-35.

⁶³Hamill, 7.

⁶⁴Ibid., 21-22.

⁶⁵Wilson, 102.

⁶⁶Hamill, 33.

⁶⁷Ibid., 68-69.

⁶⁸Ibid., 83-84.

⁶⁹Joint warfighting doctrine specifies dividing the campaign into specific phases focusing on major changes in the nature of the total effort. Each phase should lay the groundwork for its successor and are normally driven by events and not time. Branches are options for changing dispositions, orientations or declining battle. Sequels allow the commander to anticipate changes due to unexpected outcome with the enemy. These are summarized from AFSC PUB 2, II-3-21 through II-3-24.

⁷⁰Hunt, 79.

⁷¹Hamill, 87-88.

⁷²Ibid., 92-93.

⁷³Ibid., 112.

⁷⁴Ibid., 117.

⁷⁵Ibid., 147-148.

⁷⁶Ibid., 177-180.

⁷⁷Ibid., 249-250.

⁷⁸Hull, 265-266.

⁷⁹Hamill, 244-245.

⁸⁰The policy of reassurance, attrition, and deterrence is from the Planning Directive For Northern Ireland (London: Headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces, G3: August 1992), 1.

⁸¹Hunt, 82-84.

⁸²Hunt, 85.

⁸³J. Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), 1.

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